Situational Awareness in Aviation - Essential Fundamentals for Professional Pilots

By Captain Bassani - ATPL/B-727/DC-10/B-767 - Former Air Accident Inspector SIA PT. captbassani@gmail.com - Nov/2025 - https://www.personalflyer.com.br

Beyond "Knowing What's Happening"

Situational Awareness (SA) is frequently described in oversimplified terms as "knowing what is happening around you." While this definition captures part of the reality, it falls significantly short of a complete understanding of the concept. According to the widely accepted definition by Dr. Mica Endsley, a recognized world leader in situational awareness research since 1995, SA is defined as "the perception of environmental elements in relation to time or space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their future behavior". This three-faceted definition establishes the theoretical foundation that guides Crew Resource Management (CRM) training internationally, as established by the EASA.​​

The practical importance of situational awareness was tragically exemplified in January 2025, when a midair collision occurred between a Bombardier CRJ 700 operated by PSA Airlines and a Sikorsky UH-60L helicopter operated by the U.S. Army in the vicinity of Washington DC. All 65 occupants on the commercial aircraft and the entire helicopter crew perished. Preliminary investigation revealed multiple indicators of degraded situational awareness that were not adequately managed by the flight crew.​

The Three Fundamental Pillars of Situational Awareness

The Endsley model, adopted internationally by EASA and the ICAO in its publications on operational safety, identifies three essential components:​

Level 1 - Perception

Perception involves the collection of sensory information from the environment. However, a critical aspect frequently neglected is that human senses present significant limitations when flying. Visual illusions during approach procedures, such as narrow or wide runway illusions, can induce pilots to perceive their vertical position incorrectly. During night operations and in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the probability of perceptual errors increases exponentially.​

SKYbrary, the collaborative repository of EASA, emphasizes that perception involves four main components:

• Environmental Awareness - Knowledge of other aircraft, ATC communications, and meteorological conditions

• Mode Awareness - Aircraft configuration and autopilot system state

• Spatial Orientation - Geographic position and aircraft attitude

• System Awareness - Status of aircraft systems

• Temporal Horizon - Time management (fuel, critical factors in emergencies)​

  
  

Level 2 - Comprehension

Comprehension means that the pilot understands the meaning of the situation if perception is accurate. This is a frequent point of failure, especially among junior pilots and during training. In the investigation of the Washington DC accident, there was an unresolved altitude discrepancy between the pilot's altimeter (showing 300 feet) and the instructor's (showing 400 feet). No communication occurred to clarify this discrepancy, a clear failure in the shared comprehension component.​

Level 3 - Projection

Projection — the ability to anticipate future behavior — is the most challenging component of professional situational awareness. A classic example used in CRM training internationally is the highway scenario: you are driving at 80 km on a congested highway when suddenly the traffic ahead begins braking sharply. After coming to a complete stop, what is the next important thing? The correct answer is to check the rear-view mirror, you perceived and comprehended the situation, and now you are projecting the risk of rear-end collision if the driver behind you cannot stop.​

Collective Situational Awareness - The Critical Factor

A frequently underestimated concept is collective situational awareness, the aggregated level of SA of all participants in the operation. This can include the two pilots of the same aircraft, pilots of different aircraft, pilots and air traffic controllers, or pilots and maintenance personnel.

A crucial point: collective situational awareness is reduced to the level of the participant with the lowest SA. Even if one pilot maintains excellent individual situational awareness, if their first officer or the air traffic controller has degraded SA, operational safety is compromised.​

In the Washington DC accident, multiple indicators of degraded collective SA converged:

• The helicopter crew may not have clearly heard ATC mentioning that the aircraft was in a circling procedure

• An altitude discrepancy was not resolved between pilot and instructor

• Critical ATC communication about the instruction to "pass behind" the CRJ was partially cut off by overlapping transmissions

• Interpretive confusion occurred in the helicopter cockpit about which action to execute​

Indicators of Situational Awareness Degradation

CRM training, according to EASA standards and international operator practices, identifies multiple markers of potential loss of SA. Research into incidents and accidents demonstrates that in virtually all situations involving loss of SA, at least 3 of these markers were present:​

• Failure to meet targets

• Undocumented procedures or SOP deviation

• Violation of minimums or operational limitations

• Failure to monitor instruments and systems

• Communication problems - ambiguity or lack of clarity

• Unresolved discrepancies - awareness of error but failure to correct

• Preoccupation or distraction with unrelated tasks

• Confusion about position, intention, or state

• Perceived need for rush - artificial time pressure

• Last-minute changes (runway changes, altered plans)

• Fatigue and compromised cognitive resources

• Complacency - overconfidence based on past experience

Threat and Error Management (TEM)

EASA and the global aviation professional community have adopted the TEM framework as an evolution of traditional CRM. TEM recognizes that threats and errors are inevitable in daily air operations. The framework requires that professional crews:​

1. Identify specific threats (not broad categories like "airport X")

2. Discuss mitigation strategies before or immediately after identifying the threat

3. Establish specific goals and have the discipline to respect them

For example, if the identified threat is "short runway," the mitigation strategy must be specific: "mandatory go-around if the aircraft is not touching down at demarcation point X" or "if speed at Y distance is greater than Z, execute go-around".​

Defenses Against Loss of Situational Awareness

Both EASA and SKYbrary recommend robust implementation of structural defenses.

Planning Phase:

• Define specific operational objectives

• Establish clear priorities and follow SOPs rigorously

• Prepare for anomalies and expected deviations

• Conduct risk assessments - think "what if?"

• Manage workload proactively​

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Maintenance Phase:

• Constant communication between crew members

• Briefings about future expectations

• Compare projected state with actual objectives

• Define "next targets" at each phase of flight​

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Degradation Detection:

• Monitor ambiguity in ATC instructions

• Identify excessive fixation on a single system or problem

• Recognize uncoordinated tasks between crew members

• Question non-standard procedures​

Limitations of Automation and Available Tools

A critical aspect frequently neglected: safety defense systems have operational limitations that may not be widely known to the flight crew.

In the Washington DC accident, the TCAS II version 7.1 aboard the CRJ was programmed to:

• Not provide Resolution Advisories (RAs) below 900 feet AGL

• Inhibit traffic alerts (TA) below 400 feet AGL

The collision occurred at 313 feet AGL — within the altitude range where TCAS is programmed to reduce its functions.

Therefore, the system designated to prevent midair collisions was effectively disabled by the collision altitude.​

This is a perfect example of why excessive reliance on automation can compromise situational awareness. Professional pilots must know the limitations of their technological defenses.

The Concept of "Continuation Bias"

One of the greatest enemies of situational awareness is continuation bias, the tendency to continue a course of action even when clear signals indicate that such action is unwise.​

Professional pilots must recognize that when multiple markers of degraded SA begin to appear, it is time to slow down, confirm that the current course is appropriate, and if necessary, activate Plan B. Ironically, as observed by CRM experts, one of the most powerful words (and least pronounced by pilots) is: "unable."

Integration with Regulatory Requirements

ICAO Annex 6, which governs international commercial operations, and EASA specifications for CRM training, require that operators implement:

• Recurrent situational awareness training integrated with technical training

• Practical simulator exercises involving SA degradation

• Threat and Error Management training specific to each operator

• Development of resilience beyond routine procedures​​

Conclusion

Situational awareness is not an abstract concept, it is the practical foundation upon which all professional operational safety rests. It involves accurate perception of the environment, correct comprehension of its meaning, and the ability to project future developments.

For professional pilots, the lesson from the Washington DC accident and historical investigations is clear: recognize markers of degraded SA as they appear, resolve discrepancies before they accumulate, maintain precise communication with your crew and controllers, question ambiguities, and above all, recognize that no flight is so critical that it is worth the risk of flying with inadequate situational awareness.

As the international aviation professional community states:

— "The safest flight is one that is never initiated when conditions — technical or operational — degrade the collective situational awareness of the operation".

Safe Flights

Captain Luiz Bassani

References

Forrest, S. (2025). "Do you know what's going on around you?" Professional Pilot Magazine, November 2025.​

European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). (2015). Crew Resource Management (CRM) Training — Decision 2015/022/R and 2015/023/R.​

SKYbrary. (2025). "Enhancing Situational Awareness." Flight Operations Briefing Notes.​

Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems. Human Factors, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 32-64.​

Wickens, C. D. (2008). "Situation Awareness: Review of Mica Endsley's 1995 Model." PubMed Central.​

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Annex 6, Part I — Operation of Aircraft.​

U.S. Coast Guard Definition of Situational Awareness, adapted for commercial aviation.​

EASA (2017). CRM Training Implementation — Recommended Practices and Information for Air Operators.​

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